

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 150900Z NOV 76 ZFG
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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USNATO BRUSSELS 503

S E C R E T SOFIA 2432

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE

SUBJECT: US APPROACH TO CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS

REF: STATE 276093

1. WE UNDERSTAND, OF COURSE, THAT THE SEEMING INADEQUACY
OF REFTEL IS DUE TO CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE DEPARTMENT APPARENT-
LY CANNOT SHARE WITH ALL THE ADDRESSEES; AND ALSO DURING THE
CURRENT INTERREGNUM PERHAPS NOT MUCH MORE CAN BE DONE. HOW-
EVER, WE SEE A REAL DANGER THAT WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH WE
OFWILL GET CREAMED IN BELGRADE 1977. PERHAPS AT LEAST SOME
CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN EVEN NOW TO SPECIFICS, OTHERWISE
ONE IS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT THE DEPARTMENT REALLY
HAS NO UORATEGY EXCEPT NOT TO ROCK THE BOAT, NOT TO
GET OUT OF STEP WITH OUR ALLIES, AND TO WAIT FOR A CON-
SENSUS TO DEVELOP ON SOME (UNSPECIFIED) NEW APPROACHES.
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES TO SAY THAT WE WILL "PRESS

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PRIMARILY FOR MEANINGFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI

FINAL ACT" SEEMS MORE LIKE A BROMIDE THAN A STRATEGY.

2. WE THUS OFFER A FEW CONSIDERATIONS THAT WE BELIEVE DESERVE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WITH EUROPEAN POSTS; (A) PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE US CANNOT TAKE INITIATIVES WITH ITS ALLIES IN THE MATTER OF HELSINKI IMPLEMENTATION. THIS IS MOST PUZZLING. (B) SURELY DEPT DOESN'T IMAGINE THAT WE CAN SUCCESSFULLY COUNTER BLOC CRITICISM OF OUR OWN CSCE PERFORMANCE BY SAYING "OUR SYSTEM DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY". THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT MOSCOW WILL SAY WHEN WE TAX THEM WITH THEIR FAILUREYEM (C) WHY CAN WE NOT DO SOMETHING ABOUT OBSTACLES TO TIMELY VISA ISSUANCE (EVEN IF THAT MEANS CONSULTATION WITH OUR CONGRESS) AND ABOUT PUBLICATION OF EASTERN BOOKS (EVEN IF THAT MEANS SAYING ENCOURAGING THINGS TO US PUBLISHERS)? (D) WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PRAISE THOSE EE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE TAKEN POSITIVE STEPS, HOWEVER INCOMPLETE, TO IMPLEMENT CSCE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USSR ON JOURNALIST VISAS, HUNGARY ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS AND BULGARIA ON DIVIDED FAMILIES.

3. THE MOST IMPORTANT UNEXPLAINED LACUNA IN REFTTEL, HOWEVER, IS THE QUESTION OF WHERE WE PUT OUR WEIGHT IN BELGRADE 1977. IF WE AND OUR ALLIES TRY TO PUSH IN ALL DIRECTIONS WE RISK MAKING NO HEADWAY ANYWHERE. IN OUR OPINION WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR FIRE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION, TABLING CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS AS WELL AS DOCUMENTING COMMUNIST FAILURES. AT SAME TIME WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO WORK OURSELVES INTO A CORNER WHERE THE EE PLEA OF "TECHNICAL OBSTACLES" IS SEEN SIMPLY AS THE COUNTERPART TO A SIMILAR PLEA FROM OUR SIDE (SEE 2 B ABOVE). WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST US SUPPORT FOR THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT OR FORUM WHICH COULD AUTHORITATIVELY PUBLICIZE EASTERN FAILURES ON BASKET THREE.

4. EVIDENTLY FROM WASHINGTON THE TACTICAL PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO BELGRADE 1977 APPEARS MORE IN TERMS OF HOW WE OBTAIN A BROAD CONSENSUS WITH OUR ALLIES AND HOW WE LIMIT THE DAMAGE FROM EXPECTED USSR PROPAGANDA. SEEN
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FROM THIS POST SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BY ANY STRETCH OF THE TERM BE CALLED "DYNAMIC", AND IT OVERLOOKS THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT AT BELGRADE THE SOVIETS WILL TREAT THE WEST EXACTLY AS THEY DID AT THE DANUBE CONFERENCE AT BELGRADE AFTER WORLD WAR II, WHEN WE WERE LOOKING FOR SOME LOOSENING-UP BUT WERE SUBJECTED TO DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS BY VYSHINSKY AND OBTAINED NOTHING.

5. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES OF
REFTEL AS APPROPRIATE.
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